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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Justin Keith Austin appeals from the withheld judgment entered upon the
jury verdict finding him guilty of felony driving under the influence (DUI). On
appeal, Austin claims the district court abused its discretion when it ruled that
Austin’s proposed expert testimony that would have extrapolated Austin’s BAC
test results back to the time Austin was driving was inadmissible under a “per se”
theory of DUI.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At around 12:25 a.m. Austin pulled his Jeep Cherokee out of a Maverick
gas station and crossed multiple traffic lanes without using his turn signal.
(3/14/16 Tr., p. 37, L. 4 – p. 40, L. 6.) Deputy Richardson pulled Austin over for
failing to use his signal. (Id.) When Deputy Richardson made contact with
Austin he immediately smelled an odor of alcohol. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 41, Ls. 4-19.)
Austin’s eyes were “a little bloodshot and glassy” and his speech was “a little bit”
slow. (Id.) Austin admitted he had “one shot of alcohol.” (3/14/16 Tr., p. 42, Ls.
9-19.) Austin failed field sobriety tests. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 45, L. 7 – p. 69, L. 22;
R., pp. 16-18.) Austin admitted to Deputy Richardson that he knew he did not do
well on the field sobriety tests.

(3/14/16 Tr., p. 69, Ls. 10-22.)

Deputy

Richardson arrested Austin for DUI. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 69, L. 23 – p. 70, L. 14.)
Austin consented to a breath test. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 76, Ls. 12-22, p. 87, L.
24 – p. 93, L. 2; Ex. 3.) The breathalyzer, a LifeLoc FC20, was functioning
properly. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 76, L. 18 – p. 87, L. 9.) The breath test showed results
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of .085/.086. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 97, L. 16 – p. 98, L. 19; R., p. 17.) Austin had two
previous DUI convictions within ten years, so the state charged Austin with felony
DUI. (R., pp. 40-41.)
Prior to trial, Austin disclosed that he intended to call Loring Beals, a
clinical toxicologist, to testify as an expert witness. (R., pp. 98-99.) The state
filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence “relating to any measurement of
uncertainty or margin of error of the Lifeloc FC20 breath testing instrument” and
evidence “relating to the Defendant’s alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time he
was driving or stopped, and further excluding any testimony [,] other evidence,
argument or comment relating to whether Defendant’s BAC was rising between
the time he was driving or stopped and the time of the breath tests.” (R., pp.
1

108-109, 112-118.)

Austin objected. (R., pp. 119-125.) The district court held

a hearing on the state’s motion. (R., p. 126.)
The district court ruled that expert testimony regarding extrapolating blood
alcohol content was irrelevant under the “per se” theory of DUI, but it could be
relevant to an “impairment” theory if the testimony went to the effect blood
alcohol level had on the defendant’s impairment. (R., pp. 128-129; 3/14/16, Tr.,
p. 10, L. 13 – p. 11, L. 6.)
THE COURT: Here’s what I’m thinking. Under the per se theory I
agree with you that extrapolation of the results of the alcohol
concentration test back to the time when the defendant was driving
or in actual physical control is irrelevant under the statute.
However, under an impairment theory, looking at the Robinett case,
not only is it relevant, it’s required for the Court – for the jury to
1

Evidence relating to determining whether Austin’s BAC was rising between the
time he was driving and the time of the breath test is sometimes referred to as
“extrapolation” evidence.
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consider an alcohol concentration test that was taken at a time
other than when the defendant was driving or in actual physical
control.
Not only that, but there has to be testimony as to what, if
any, effect it has on the defendant’s impairment, if any. I think
that’s the clear holding of Robinett, which is still the law on the
impairment theory. I know it doesn’t make much sense, but then I
didn’t write the decisions either.
(3/14/16, Tr., p. 10, L. 13 – p. 11, L. 6.)
Defense counsel clarified that Austin was seeking to introduce expert
testimony only regarding the “per se” theory of DUI. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 25, L. 24 –
p. 27, L. 3.) Specifically, Austin’s expert, based upon information provided by
Austin, would testify that Austin’s BAC would have been approximately .06 at the
time he was driving. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 1-20.) The district court determined
it was bound by controlling Idaho case law and rejected Austin’s argument.
(3/14/16 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 4-12.)
THE COURT: Conceptually I’ll agree with you, but – and if I had a
blank tablet that I was operating under, I would say, you know,
you’re right. But the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have
ruled on the issue. Admittedly I don’t think they ever discussed the
due process – due process concept. But if I understand the series
of cases, that type of testimony comes in under an impairment
theory, but not under a per se theory.
(3/14/16 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 4-12.) Austin then conferred with his expert to make a
decision whether the defense would still call the expert to testify regarding
impairment. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 7-13.) At the start of the second day of trial,
Austin informed the court that he decided not to call his expert. (3/15/16 Tr., p.
144, Ls. 18-19.)

3

At trial, the state argued both the “per se” theory and the impairment
2
theory. (3/15/16 Add. Tr., p. 207, L. 6 – p. 208, L. 5. ) The state’s expert, Gary

Dawson, reviewed the police reports and the police video, including the recording
of the field sobriety tests, and testified Austin was “impaired beyond the ability to
safely operate a motor vehicle.” (3/15/16 Tr., p. 268, L. 25 – p. 271, L. 21.)
The jury found Austin guilty of DUI and the district court found that he had
twice been convicted of substantially conforming DUIs. (R., pp. 156-157.) The
district court withheld judgment and placed Austin on probation for seven years.
(R., pp. 161-163.) Austin timely appealed. (R., pp. 169-171.)

2

The October 14, 2015 Motion to Suppress hearing, the March 9, 2016 Pretrial
Conference, and portions of the March 14 and 15 Jury Trial are transcribed in a
separate volume, labeled “Additional Transcript.” When the Additional Transcript
is cited respondent will use the designation “Add. Tr.”
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ISSUES
Austin states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the
State’s motion in limine because it did not apply the relevant
precedent correctly and violated Mr. Austin’s due process
right to present a complete defense?

2.

Does the dicta in Tomlinson render Idaho Code § 18-8004
overbroad and void for vagueness as applied?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Austin failed to show the district court abused its discretion
when it properly applied prior precedent and excluded Austin’s irrelevant
“extrapolation” evidence?
2.
Has Austin failed to establish that it was fundamental error for the
district court not to sua sponte rule that Idaho Code § 18-8004 was
unconstitutional ?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Ruled That Austin’s
Proposed Extrapolation Evidence Was Inadmissible
A.

Introduction
Austin proposed to introduce expert testimony that his blood alcohol

concentration was rising from the time he was driving to the time he took the
breathalyzer test.

(See 3/14/16 Tr., p. 26, Ls. 1-20.)

The state moved to

exclude this evidence. (R., pp. 108-109, 112-118.) The district court applied
prior precedent and ruled that Austin’s proposed extrapolation evidence was
inadmissible as to the “per se” theory of DUI. (See R., pp. 128-132; 3/14/16, p.
10, L. 13 – p. 11, L. 6, p. 27, Ls. 4-12.) On appeal, Austin claims that the district
court abused its discretion because the prior precedent, specifically, State v.
Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112, 357 P.3d 238 (Ct. App. 2015) (review denied Oct. 14,
2015), was either wrongly decided or contained dicta on which the district court
relied, and that the exclusion of his proposed extrapolation evidence violated his
right to present a defense. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-24.) Austin’s appellate
arguments fail. The applicable holding in Tomlinson was properly based upon
prior precedent and the plain language of I.C. § 18-8004, and Austin’s right to
present a defense was not infringed.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The decision to allow or exclude expert testimony is within the discretion

of the trial court and will not be set aside absent a showing of abuse of
discretion.” State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853, 26 P.3d 31, 36 (2001) (citing
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State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 875, 908 P.2d 566, 568 (1995); State v. Crea,
119 Idaho 352, 353, 806 P.2d 445, 446 (1991)).
In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, the appellate court
must determine whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one
involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific
choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (citing
State v. Powell, 125 Idaho 889, 891, 876 P.2d 587, 589 (1994); State v. Hedger,
115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
C.

Austin Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it applied Idaho

precedent and granted the state’s motion to preclude Austin from introducing
extrapolation evidence in an attempt to show that his BAC was lower when he
was driving than when he took the breath test. (See 3/14/16 Tr., p. 10, L. 13 – p.
11, L. 6, p. 27, Ls. 4-12.) On appeal, Austin argues that he “had a right to
present scientific evidence that his alcohol concentration, when he was driving,
was not over the legal limit.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) Austin’s argument is not
supported by Idaho law because, under the “per se” theory of DUI, the relevant
BAC is Austin’s BAC when he took the breath test, not when he was driving.
Idaho Code 18-8004(1)(a) provides:
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol,
drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of
alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has
an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of
this section, or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or
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breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon
public or private property open to the public.
Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a).
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the foregoing language “as
establishing one crime with two ways of proving a violation.” State v. Robinett,
141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005) (citations omitted). “[T]he first
way to prove a violation is to show under the totality of the evidence that the
defendant was driving under the influence.” Id. “The second way to prove a
violation is to establish the defendant drove with an alcohol concentration of 0.08
percent or more.” Id. The second method is commonly referred to as the “per
se” theory. See, e.g., State v. Juarez, 155 Idaho 449, 452, 313 P.3d 777, 780
(Ct. App. 2013) (“In regard to a per se violation under section 18–8004(1)(a), the
criminal act is having an ‘alcohol concentration of 0.08 ... or more, as shown by
analysis of his blood, urine, or breath.’”).

“The State may elect to proceed

against the defendant under either or both theories of proof.”

Robinett, 141

Idaho at 112, 106 P.3d at 438. Further, “[e]vidence that is relevant under one
theory of proof is not necessarily relevant under the other.”

Id. (citations

omitted).
In State v. Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho 200, 202-203, 280 P.3d 703, 705-706
(2012), the Idaho Supreme Court considered a claim that a hearing officer in an
administrative license suspension case violated the defendant’s due process
rights “by failing to take into account the margin of error of the Lifeloc FC20.” In
addressing this issue, the Court recited its prior holding in Robinett, which was
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based on the 1984 version of I.C. § 18-8004, that where the state “seek[s] to
establish a per se violation (the defendant’s BAC exceeded the statutory limit),
then it [is] not necessary to extrapolate the test results back to the time the
defendant was driving.” Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203, 280 P.3d at 706 (citing
Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 106 P.3d 436). The Court then reviewed the 1987
amendment to I.C. § 18-8004, which eliminated the need for a “determination of
alcohol concentration in the blood to prove a per se violation,” and instead
allowed the state to establish such a violation “simply by the test results.” Id. at
204, 280 P.3d at 707. Thus, the Court observed, “[a]fter the 1987 amendment, a
violation can be shown simply by the results of a test for alcohol concentration
that complies with the statutory requirements. With that change, the margin of
error in the testing equipment is irrelevant.” Id.
Specifically addressing the legislature’s authority to define crimes, the
Court further stated:
The legislature has the authority to make driving a motor vehicle
with any alcohol in one’s system a crime and/or a ground for
suspension of one’s driver’s license. When the statute declared it
a crime for a person to drive a motor vehicle with “alcohol in his
blood” greater than a specified amount, we did not require the
State to establish the precise amount of alcohol in the driver’s
blood at the time of driving, even though we knew that the alcohol
concentration in the driver’s blood at the time of the driving could
be lower than at the time of testing. In essence, we held that the
driver took the risk that the concentration of alcohol in his blood at
the time of testing would be greater than it was when he was
actually driving an hour earlier. After the 1987 amendments, the
standard is no longer the concentration of alcohol in the driver’s
blood. It is simply the alcohol concentration shown by an approved
and properly administered test of the driver’s breath, blood, or
urine. Because the actual alcohol concentration in the driver’s
blood is no longer the standard, the testing machine’s margin of
error is irrelevant.
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Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205-206, 280 P.3d at 708-709.
The Court in Elias-Cruz made clear that the margin of error of a breathtesting machine is irrelevant. Id. The Court also made clear in Elias-Cruz, and
cases preceding it, that the relevant question under a “per se” theory of driving
under the influence is the BAC at the time of the test, not when the defendant
was driving. Id.
In Tomlinson, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals applied the holding in
Elias-Cruz, and held that the relevant question under a “per se” theory of DUI is
the BAC at the time of the test. See Tomlinson, 159 Idaho at 121-122, 357 P.3d
at 247-248.

Tomlinson was arrested for DUI and he provided two breath

samples which returned BAC results of .083 and .082. Id. at 115, 357 P.3d at
241. The state proceeded solely on the “per se” theory of DUI. Id. Prior to trial,
the state filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude, among other things,
evidence “whether Tomlinson’s blood alcohol concentration has ascended or
descended from the time he was stopped to the time he provided the breath
sample.” Id. The magistrate precluded Tomlinson from introducing evidence
regarding his blood alcohol level at the time he was driving. Id. at 116, 357 P.3d
at 242. The jury found Tomlinson guilty of DUI and Tomlinson appealed to the
district court. Id. The district court affirmed. Id.
On appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals, Tomlinson argued, among other
things, that the magistrate erred by excluding evidence “whether Tomlinson’s
blood alcohol concentration was ascending between the time he was stopped
and when the breath test was given.” Id. at 119, 357 P.3d at 245. As noted by
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the Idaho Court of Appeals, under the “per se” theory of liability the state was
required to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt, that Tomlinson had an alcohol
concentration of .08 or above at the time the test was taken.” Id. at 120, 357
P.3d at 246 (citing Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112, 106 P.3d at 438; State v. Sutliff,
97 Idaho 523, 524, 547 P.2d 1128, 1129 (1976); Juarez, 155 Idaho at 452, 313
P.3d at 780)). “Indeed, such proof is conclusive, not presumptive, of guilt.” Id.
(citing State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 135, 867 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Ct. App.
1994); State v. Andrus, 118 Idaho 711, 713, 800 P.2d 107, 109 (Ct. App. 1990)).
The only question, under a “per se” theory of liability, is the alcohol concentration
in the defendant’s blood, breath or urine at the time the sample was taken. Id.
“[T]he alcohol concentration in a defendant’s blood, breath, or urine at the time
he or she was driving is irrelevant.” Id. at 122, 357 P.3d at 248. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the district court did not err in affirming the magistrate’s
decision to exclude evidence whether Tomlinson’s blood alcohol concentration
was ascending between the time he was stopped and when the breath test was
given. Id.
Here, the district court properly applied the correct legal standards and
determined that Austin’s proposed extrapolation evidence was not admissible
under the “per se” theory of DUI. (See 3/14/16 Tr., p. 10, L. 13 – p. 11, L. 6, p.
27, Ls. 4-12.) On appeal, Austin argues the district court abused its discretion
because Elias-Cruz involved the margin of error on the breath testing machinery
and the Court of Appeals’ discussion of expert testimony in Tomlinson was

11

“dicta.”

(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-20.)

Alternatively, Austin argues

Tomlinson should be overruled or “narrowed to its facts.” (See id.)
Austin’s “dicta” argument is misplaced.

The applicable holding of

Tomlinson is broader than the discussion of a potential expert witness.

The

Court in Tomlinson stated that blood alcohol extrapolation evidence is irrelevant
to a “per se” theory of DUI and the trial court properly excluded this evidence at
trial. This statement is the holding, not dicta, because it was necessary to decide
the issue on appeal. “If the statement is not necessary to decide the issue
presented to the appellate court, it is considered to be dictum and not
controlling.” State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74, 305 P.3d 513, 518 (2013)
(citing Petersen v. State, 87 Idaho 361, 365, 393 P.2d 585, 587 (1964)). “Dicta
are opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of
the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point, are not
the professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself.” Smith v. Angell,
122 Idaho 25, 34–35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1172–1173 (1992) (J. Bistline, dissenting)
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 454 (6th ed. 1990)).
Dictum. A statement, remark, or observation. Gratis dictum; a
gratuitous or voluntary representation; one which a party is not
bound to make. Simplex dictum; a mere assertion; an assertion
without proof.
The word is generally used as an abbreviated form of obiter dictum,
‘a remark by the way;’ that is, an observation or remark made by a
judge in pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some
rule, principle, or application of law, or the solution of a question
suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the
case or essential to its determination; any statement of the law
enunciated by the court merely by way of illustration, argument,
analogy, or suggestion. Statements and comments in an opinion
concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily
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involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand or obiter
dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 98
Colo. 568, 58 P.2d 1223, 1226 [1936]. Dicta are opinions of a
judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the
court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the
point, are not the professed deliberate determinations of the judge
himself.
Id.
In Tomlinson, the issue whether extrapolation evidence was properly
excluded from trial was specifically raised and argued on appeal.

See

Tomlinson, 159 Idaho at 119, 357 P.3d at 245.
Tomlinson also contends that the district court erred in affirming
various evidentiary rulings by the magistrate. Specifically,
Tomlinson argues that the magistrate erred in excluding evidence
regarding … whether Tomlinson’s blood alcohol concentration was
ascending between the time he was stopped and when the breath
test was given[.]
Id. Tomlinson analyzed the applicable statute, I.C. 18-8004, and the applicable
case law, including Elias-Cruz, Robinett, State v. Hardesty, 136 Idaho 707, 39
P.3d 647 (Ct. App. 2002), and State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 804 P.2d 936
(Ct. App.1991). See Tomlinson, 159 Idaho at 119-122, 357 P.3d at 245-248.
Based upon this law the Court of Appeals held:
No Idaho appellate court has ever held, under the post–1987 DUI
statute, that evidence regarding a defendant’s alcohol
concentration at a time other than when an evidentiary test was
performed is relevant under a per se theory of liability. Thus, the
alcohol concentration in a defendant’s blood, breath, or urine at the
time he or she was driving is irrelevant. The district court did not err
in affirming the magistrate’s decision to exclude such evidence as
irrelevant.
Id. at 119-122, 357 P.3d at 245-248. This holding directly addressed the issue
raised on appeal regarding the admissibility of evidence that Tomlinson’s blood
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alcohol concentration was ascending after he was stopped. This holding is not
dicta.
Austin’s argument that Tomlinson should be overruled or “narrowed to its
facts” is similarly misplaced. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-20.) A prior opinion
will not be overruled unless it shown to have been manifestly wrong, or the
holding has proven, over time, to be unwise or unjust. See State v. Koivu, 152
Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations omitted) (the Court “will
ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior opinions unless it is shown to have been
manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has proven over time to be unwise
or unjust”); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992)
(“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.”). Austin argues that Tomlinson
misapplied prior case law. (See id.) Austin argues:
It is true that the cases Tomlinson relied on stand for the
proposition that the State is not required to extrapolate back to
have test results admitted. But they most certainly do not stand for
the proposition that a defendant is not allowed to present
extrapolation evidence in order to defend himself. One does not
follow from the other.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 16 (emphasis in original).) This argument to overrule prior
precedent fails.
Idaho Code Section § 18-8004 provides the mechanisms for establishing
a defendant is guilty of driving under the influence. One mechanism is to show
that the defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of .08, or higher, as
established by a test conducted pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), and that the
defendant drove, or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. I.C. § 18-
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8004(1)(a). The statute does not say that the defendant’s BAC must be .08 or
above “while” driving. Case law makes clear that the defendant’s “actual” alcohol
concentration is irrelevant. See State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 375 P.3d 279
(2016).
However, as we explained in Elias–Cruz, the actual alcohol
concentration is irrelevant. Rather, it is the alcohol concentration
as shown by the test result that is determinative of a violation.
Id. at 452, 375 P.3d at 282 (citing Elias–Cruz, 153 Idaho at 204-205, 280 P.3d at
707–708). As the Idaho Supreme Court explained, it is within the power of the
legislature to define crimes and place conditions on the right to drive and that
can include not requiring evidence of the exact amount of alcohol in the
defendant’s blood:
There is no constitutional right to drive with alcohol in one’s system.
The legislature has the authority to define crimes, State v. Prather,
135 Idaho 770, 775, 25 P.3d 83, 88 (2001), and to place conditions
upon the right to drive a motor vehicle, State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho
166, 171, 125 P.3d 522, 527 (2005) (suspending a driver’s license
for underage drinking), and Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho
99, 104, 416 P.2d 46, 51 (1966) (suspending a driver’s license for
failure to deposit security for payment of judgment). The legislature
has the authority to make driving a motor vehicle with any alcohol
in one’s system a crime and/or a ground for suspension of one’s
driver’s license. When the statute declared it a crime for a person
to drive a motor vehicle with “alcohol in his blood” greater than a
specified amount, we did not require the State to establish the
precise amount of alcohol in the driver’s blood at the time of
driving, even though we knew that the alcohol concentration in the
driver’s blood at the time of driving could be lower than at the time
of testing.
Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205, 280 P.3d at 708.
Thus, the holding in Tomlinson is directly in line with the applicable Idaho
case law that holds the results of the alcohol concentration test, not the “actual”
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alcohol concentration while driving, are determinative of liability under I.C. § 188004. It was well within the powers of the legislature to define the crime in this
manner. Contrary to Austin’s argument on appeal, Tomlinson was not wrongly
decided, but was a correct application of applicable case law.
D.

Austin Does Not Have A Constitutional Due Process Right To Present
Irrelevant Evidence
Austin argues the district court’s exclusion of his extrapolation evidence

denied his due process right to present a defense. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.
21-24.) Austin’s due process argument relies upon a similar misunderstanding
of Idaho Code § 18-8004 as his evidentiary argument. Austin argues “I.C. § 188004(1) makes it clear that one of the elements of the crime of driving under the
influence is having an alcohol concentration over the limit while driving.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 21-22 (emphasis in original).) As noted above, this is
incorrect.
Contrary to Austin’s argument on appeal, the plain language of the statute
does not require a defendant to have a blood alcohol level of 0.08 “while” driving.
Rather, under the plain language of the statute, a “per se” violation is occurs, not
when the person drives, but when the “analysis of his blood, urine, or breath” is a
0.08 or above. The statute provides that it is “unlawful for any person … who
has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section,
or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a
highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public.”
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I.C. 18-8004(1) (emphasis added). Since it is impossible to analyze a driver’s
blood, urine or breath before he or she is stopped and tested, it is clear the
legislature intended the operative BAC to be the BAC at the time of the analysis,
not the BAC while driving.
Austin’s due process argument is based upon a different reading of I.C. §
18-8004 than the one given to it in Elias-Cruz, Tomlinson, and Jones. Under
Idaho law interpreting I.C. § 18-8004, the extrapolation evidence is irrelevant.
There is no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence. State v. Marks,
156 Idaho 559, 563, 328 P.3d 539, 543 (Ct. App. 2014) (constitutional right to
present a defense does not “permit an accused to present irrelevant evidence”).
The Supreme Court said as much in Elias-Cruz:

“There is no due process

violation in excluding irrelevant evidence. There is no constitutional right to drive
with alcohol in one’s system.” 153 Idaho at 205, 280 P.3d at 708. Austin’s
interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-8004 is contrary to both the plain language of
the statute and the Idaho appellate Courts’ repeated interpretation of it. His
proposed extrapolation evidence is irrelevant, and there is no constitutional right
to present irrelevant evidence.
II.
Austin Has Failed To Establish It Was Fundamental Error For The District Court
To Not Rule Idaho Code § 18-8004 Is Unconstitutional
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal Austin argues that Idaho Code § 18-8004 is

void for vagueness and is unconstitutionally overbroad. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp. 24-34.) Because these theories were not presented to the district court they
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are reviewed for fundamental error on appeal. Austin has failed to show it was
fundamental error for the district court to not sua sponte rule I.C. § 18-8004 is
unconstitutional.
B.

Standard Of Review
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court

reviews it de novo. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131
(2003). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the
statute. Id. The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute
that upholds its constitutionality. Id.
C.

The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error By Not Sua Sponte
Ruling I.C. § 18-8004 Unconstitutional
Austin did not move the district court to rule that I.C. § 18-8004 was void

for vagueness or unconstitutionally overbroad. On appeal, Austin concedes that
“[t]his issue was not directly raised below.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 24.) However,
Austin argues that the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-8004 was preserved because
the district court asked questions that “revealed its concern about vagueness in
particular.” (Id.) Questions by the district court do not amount to Austin raising
the issue that I.C. § 18-8004 was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. These
were not theories advanced by Austin before the district court.
“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal,
and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to
the lower court.” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, No. 44443, 2017 WL 2569786, at *3
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(Idaho June 14, 2017) (citing Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through
Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799–800, 589 P.2d 540, 546–47 (1979);
Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 119, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005); Frasier v.
Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 82, 437 P.2d 32, 35 (1968)) (“We have held generally that
this court will not review issues not presented in the trial court, and that parties
will be held to the theory on which the cause was tried.”). Austin did not advance
a theory that I.C. 18-8004 was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad before the
district court.

Nor was there a ruling by the district court regarding the

constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-8004. State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 557,
224 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2010) (“In order for an issue to be raised on
appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling that forms the basis for the
assignment of error.”) (citations omitted). Therefore Austin is limited to arguing it
was fundamental error for the district court to not sua sponte rule I.C. § 18-8004
unconstitutional.
Fundamental error is an error that “so profoundly distorts the trial that it
produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to
due process.” State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). In
order to constitute fundamental error the defendant must show that the error: “(1)
violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly
exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228,
245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). Austin’s argument on appeal fails all three prongs.
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1.

Idaho Code § 18-8004 Does Not Violate Austin’s Unwaived
Constitutional Rights

For the first time on appeal, Austin argues that Idaho Code § 18-8004, as
interpreted by Tomlinson, violates his unwaived due process rights because it is
void for vagueness and unconstitutionally overbroad. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.
24-34.) Both of Austin’s arguments fail.
Austin’s arguments initially fail because Austin is not actually challenging
the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-8004 itself. (See Appellant’s brief, p.
27.) Instead of arguing I.C. § 18-8004 is unconstitutional, Austin argues that the
holding in Tomlinson makes I.C. § 18-8004 unconstitutional. (See id. (“As an
initial point, Mr. Austin does not argue that the statute is vague on its face
because he asserts that the statute as written allows for a defendant to put on
evidence of his alcohol concentration at the time of driving as it is clear that this
is the prohibited conduct.

Under Tomlinson, however, such evidence is

supposedly irrelevant.”).) Austin’s argument is illogical.
If Austin concedes that I.C. § 18-8004 passes constitutional muster, and it
is only Tomlinson that is unconstitutional, any constitutional issue is with
Tomlinson – not I.C. § 18-8004.

Austin should therefore have argued that

Tomlinson should be overruled, not that Idaho Code § 18-8004 is
unconstitutional.3 Therefore, the basic premise of Austin’s argument fails and
Austin has failed to meet the first prong of the fundamental error analysis.

3

Presumably this is partially why Austin argued that Tomlinson was wrongly
decided. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-20.)
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a.

Idaho Code § 18-8004 Is Not Void-For-Vagueness Because
Ordinary People Can Understand What Conduct Is
Prohibited

Even if Austin’s void-for-vagueness argument is considered, Idaho Code
§ 18-8004 is not void-for-vagueness. “[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires
that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Knutsen,
158 Idaho 199, 202, 345 P.3d 989, 992 (2015) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). “[T]he more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is
not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the
requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.’” Id. (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358). “A criminal defendant
that engages in conduct that is clearly proscribed by the statute cannot complain
that it may be vague as applied to the conduct of others.” Id. (quoting Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 19-20 (2010)).
“A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute
or regulation under which it is obtained ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it
authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’” F.C.C. v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (quoting United States v.
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). Thus, “the void-for-vagueness doctrine
addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary and discriminatory
prosecutions.”

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010) (citing
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Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357). Statutes, however, have a “strong presumption” of
validity and the court must, if it can, “construe, not condemn” them. Id. at 402403 (internal quotes and citations omitted).

That “close cases can be

envisioned” is insufficient to “render[] a statute vague” because the state must
still prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams, 553 U.S. at 305-306.
Even if a statute’s “outermost boundaries” are “imprecise,” such uncertainty has
“little relevance” if the “appellant’s conduct falls squarely within the ‘hard core’ of
the statute’s proscriptions.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973);
see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412 (citing Broadrick).
Austin argues that the statute, as interpreted by Tomlinson, “fails to give
notice of what the prohibited conduct is because the test result is all that
matters.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 33.)

And “in theory, the acts of driving and

drinking could be days apart, but the prosecutor could still prosecute.”

(Id.)

Austin’s argument fails. The statute, as interpreted by case law, does not fail to
provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited. Under
the plain language of the statute, a “per se” violation occurs when a person
drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle, in a place open to the
public, and then provides a test result that shows an alcohol concentration of
0.08 or more. See I.C. 18-8004(1). A person of ordinary intelligence has fair
notice of what is prohibited.

Austin’s extreme hypotheticals of prosecutions

based on breath tests administered days after driving does not render the statute
void for vagueness. Even if the outermost boundaries of the scope of I.C. § 188004 are imprecise and close calls can be envisioned it does not render the
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statute unconstitutional.

Further, Austin’s extreme hypotheticals have little

relevance here, because Austin’s conduct falls squarely within the “hard core” of
Idaho Code § 18-8004’s proscriptions. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 608. “A
criminal defendant that engages in conduct that is clearly proscribed by the
statute cannot complain that it may be vague as applied to the conduct of
others.” Knutsen, 158 Idaho at 202, 345 P.3d at 992. Austin has failed to show
Idaho Code § 18-8004 is void-for-vagueness.
b.

Idaho Code § 18-8004 Is Not Overbroad Because It Does
Not Regulate Any Constitutionally Protected Conduct

Austin has also failed to show Idaho Code § 18-8004 is overbroad. “The
overbreadth doctrine is aimed at statutes which, though designed to prohibit
legitimately regulated conduct, include within their prohibitions constitutionally
protected freedoms.” State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 423, 272 P.3d 382,
395 (2012) (citing Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133). There is a twopart test to determine whether a statute is overbroad:
(1) whether the statute regulates constitutionally protected conduct,
and
(2) whether the statute precludes a significant amount of that
constitutionally protected conduct.
Id. (citing Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133). A statute is overbroad if
both parts of the test are answered in the affirmative.

Id.

A statute is not

overbroad “merely because it is possible to imagine some unconstitutional
applications.” Id. at 424, 272 P.3d at 396 (citing Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714, 69
P.3d at 134). “The overbreadth doctrine is ‘strong medicine,’ and courts employ
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it only as a last resort.” Id. at 435, 272 P.3d at 407 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at
613).
Here, Austin has failed to show what constitutionally protected conduct is
regulated by Idaho Code § 18-8004, and he has failed to show that Idaho Code
§ 18-8004 precludes a significant amount of that constitutionally protected
conduct. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-34.) There is no constitutional right to
drink and drive. See Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 205, 280 P.3d at 708. Idaho Code
§ 18-8004 is not overbroad and Austin has failed to establish the first prong of
the fundamental error analysis.
2.

The Error Is Not Clear From The Record

Austin has failed to show that any error is clear from the record. An error
plainly exists if the error is clear from the record and there is not any need for
additional information, including information as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. On
appeal, Austin states “the error is clear from the record as the district court’s
decision to grant the State’s motion was a violation of Mr. Austin’s due process
rights because, under the dicta in Elias-Cruz and Tomlinson, the statute was
rendered overbroad and void for vagueness as applied, and there was no
indication that counsel did not explicitly raise the issue because of some
strategic decision.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 25.) Austin’s fails this prong of the
fundamental error analysis for the same reason he failed the first prong, because
there was no constitutional violation. See supra § II(C)(1). Even if there was
error for the district court to not sua sponte rule I.C. § 18-8004 unconstitutional,
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that error is certainly not clear from the record. The minimal argument provided
by Austin regarding “clear error” has failed to establish any error was clear from
the record.
3.

Austin Has Failed To Show Any Error Was Not Harmless Because
The State Presented An Alternate “Impairment” Theory To The
Jury In Addition To The “Per Se” Theory

Austin has failed to show error. Even if there was error, Austin has failed
to show the error was not harmless. In order to meet the third prong of the
fundamental error analysis, “the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it
must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Perry, 150 Idaho at
226, 245 P.3d at 978. Austin has failed to demonstrate that the error affected
the outcome of the trial proceedings.
Austin dedicates one sentence to his harmless error argument.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 25 (“And finally, violating Mr. Austin’s due process rights
affected the outcome of the proceedings because it denied him the right to
present a defense.”).) Austin’s harmless error argument focuses solely on the
“per se” portion of I.C. § 18-8004. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-34.) Specifically
that I.C. 18-8004, as interpreted by case law, is unconstitutional because
extrapolation evidence is irrelevant.

(See id.)

However, at trial the state

proceeded on both a “per se” theory of DUI and the “impairment” theory. (See
3/14/16 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 1-13; 3/15/16 Add. Tr., p. 207, L. 6 – p. 208, L. 5.) Austin
does not claim the outcome of the trial would have been different had he been
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permitted to introduce extrapolation evidence in relation to the “per se” theory nor
can he because there was substantial evidence that Austin drove while impaired.
Austin crossed multiple traffic lanes without using his turn signal. (3/14/16
Tr., p. 37, L. 4 – p. 40, L. 6.) When Deputy Richardson pulled Austin over he
immediately smelled an odor of alcohol. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 41, Ls. 4-19.) Austin’s
eyes were “a little bloodshot and glassy” and his speech was “a little bit” slow.
(Id.) Austin admitted he had “one shot of alcohol.” (3/14/16 Tr., p. 42, Ls. 9-19.)
Austin failed field sobriety tests. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 45, L. 7 – p. 69, L. 22; R., pp.
16-18.) Austin admitted to Deputy Richardson that he knew he did not do well
on the field sobriety tests. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 69, Ls. 10-22.) The deputies had
body cameras that recorded the interaction with Austin. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 70, L. 15
– p. 75, L. 10; Exs. 1, 2.) The state’s expert, Gary Dawson, reviewed the police
reports and the police video, including the recording of the field sobriety tests,
and testified Austin was “impaired beyond the ability to safely operate a motor
vehicle.” (3/15/16 Tr., p. 268, L. 25 – p. 271, L. 21.) The district court offered to
let Austin present his expert regarding the “impairment” theory, but Austin
declined. (3/14/16 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 4-12, p. 31, Ls. 7-13; 3/15/16 Tr., p. 144, Ls.
18-19.) Thus, the outcome of the trial would not have been different because
Austin still would have been convicted under the impairment theory of DUI.
Austin has failed to show fundamental error.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Austin’s withheld
judgment.
DATED this 28th day of June, 2017.
_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson_________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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